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THE LAW OF IMPEACHMENT.
THE law of impeachment ,has recently assumed an importance

which renders a discussion of its principles peculiarly- appropriate
at this time. The exercise of the power of impeachment is fortu,.
nately of such rare occurrence that less attention has been paid'
to it than its importance deserves.
For the purpose of ascertaining the impeachable character of an
act done or omitted, reference must be had to the Constitution,
expounded as it is by history, by parliamentary and common law.
The provisions of the Constitution which relate to or illustrate
the law of impeachment, ire these :"The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and
other office7s, and shall have the sole power of impeachment:'
Art. 1,§ 2.
"The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments;.
When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried; the
Chief Justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted.
without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.
"Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy
any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States ; but
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the party convicts" shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law :"
Art. 1, § 3.
- In case of the removal of- the President'from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties
of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President,
and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal,
death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and VicePresident, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and
such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed
or a President shall be elected:" Art. 2, § 1.
"The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states,
when called into the actual service, of the United States; he may
require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of
the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties
of their respective offices; and he shall .have power to grant
reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States,
except in cases of impeachment :" Art. 2, § 2.
"The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the
United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors :" Art. 2, § 4.
"The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall
be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said
crimes shall have been committed; but when not colnmitted within
any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed:" Art. 3, §2.
The convention which framed the Constitution "proceeded in
the same manner, it is manifest they did in many other cases;
they considered the object of their legislation as a. known thing,
having a previous definite existence. Thus existing, their work
was solely to mould it into a suitable shape. They have given
it to us, not as a thing of their oreation, but -merely of their
modification." 1
I Bayard on Blount's Trial 264, and he added: "And therefore I shall insist
that it remains as at common law [parliamentary) with the variance only of the
positive provisions of the Constitution :" Wharton's State Trials 264; Rawle on
Const. 200.
"The Constitution *

*

refers to * * impeachment without defining it.

It
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In England, a majority of the lords impeach, though by common law, twelve peers must be present' and concur. Here, the
concurrence of two-thirds of the memibers [of the Senate] present
is requisite.
In England, the character and extent of the punishment is in
the discretion of the lords. Here, it cannot extend further than
to removal from and disqualification to hold office.
In England, "all the king's subjects are impeachable in Parliament. 12 Here, according to the received construction, "none
are liable to. impeachment except officers of the government." 3
In England, the lords are not sworn in trying an impeachment,
assumes the existence * * and silently points us to English precedents for knowledge of details. We are reminded of the statement * * that 'the Constitution is
an instrument of. enumeration and not of definition:'" Prof. Dwight, 6 Am.
Law Reg. N. §. 257.
t 5 Comyn's Digest 398, ParliamentL.
2 2 Wooddeson's Lictures 602.
3 In Chase's Trial, Mr. Rodney "utterly disclaimed the idea that" any but
officers were liable to impeachment.
Wharton says in reference to Blount's Trial: " In a legal point of view all that
this case deiides is that a Senator of the United States, who has been expelled from
his seat, is not, after such expulsion, subject to impeachment, and perhaps from
this the broader proposition may -be drawn that none are liable to impeachment
except officers of the government, in the technical sense, excluding thereby members of the national legislature. Afterwards, from the expulsion of Mr. Smith, a
Senator from Ohio, for connection with Burr's conspiracy, instead of his impeachment, the same implication arises:" Wharton's State Trials 317, note.
In this case Mr. Biyard maintained "that all persons * * are liable to impeachment'"-that the Constitution does not define the cases or describe the persons"
designed as the objects of impeachment. "We are designedly left to the regula-"
tions of the common [parliamentary] law." This view is confirmed by the fact
that Art. 2, § 4, imperatively requires "removal from office," in case of the President, Vice-President, and officers, while Art. I, § 3, seems to admit of less punishment than this, and which must, therefore, apply to persons other than officers..
See Wickliffie's argument, Peck's Trial 309. The Constitution of New York of
1777 is said to have been the model from which the impeachment clauses of the
Constitution of the United States were copied: 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 277. That
of New York limits impeachments to officers in terms-that of the United States
does not. There may be agents and others for whom impeachments would be
salutary.
In England military and naval officers are impeachable. If a military or naval
officer here should conspire with the President to overthrow Congress, the impeachment of both would be a necessary protection which it may be doubted if the Constitution intended to surrender. In such case a court-martial could not, against
the President's will, remove from office-impeachment alone would be effectual:
Wharton's State Trials 290.
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i-A give their 'decision upon their honor.

Here, Senators act

-ider the solemn sanction of an oath or affirmation. In England,
the Crown is not impeachable. Here, the President is.
I t England, impeachment nfay, to some extent, be regarded asa mode of trial designed, inter alia, to punish crime, though not
entirely so, since a judgment on an impeachment is no answer to
an indictment in the King's Bench.1 Here, impeachment is only
designed to remove unfit persons from office; and the party convicted is subject to indictment, trial, and punishment in the
proper courts.
It is absurd to say that impeachment is here a mode of procedure for the punishment of crime,2 when the Constitution declares
its object to be removal from and disqualificationto hold office,
and that "the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according
to law," for his crimes."
Subject to these modifications, and adopting the recognised rule,
that the Constitution should be construed so as to be equal to the
occasions for its exercise, and to accomplish the purposes of its
framers, impeachment remains here as it was recognised in England at and prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
These limitations were imposed in view of the abuses of the
power of impeachment in English history~a
I Rtzharris's Case, 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 262.
2 ",
Impeachment is a proceeding purely of a political nature. It is not so much
designed to punish the offender as to secure the state. It touches neither his person
nor his property, but simply divests him of his political capacity:" Bayard's Speech
*on Blount's Trial; Wharton's State Trials 263.
' "The earliest recorded instance of impeachment by the Commons at the bar
of the House of Lords was in the reign of Edward I1. (1376). Before that time
the lords appear to have tried both peers and commoners for great public offences,
but not upon complaints addressed to them by the Commons. During the next
four reigns cases of regular impeachment were frequent; but no instances occurred
in the reigns of Edward IV., Henry VII., Henry VIII., Edward VI., Queen Mary
and Queen Elizabeth.
"The institution had fallen into disuse," (says Mr. Hallam, 1 Const. Hist.
357), "partly from the loss of that control which the Commons had obtained under
Richard II. and the Lancastrian kings, and partly from the preference the Tudor
prinmces had given to bills of attainder or of pains and penalties, when they wished
to turn the arm of Parliament against an obnoxious subject."
"1Prosecutions also in the Star Chamber, during that time, were perpetually
resorted to by the Crown for the punishment of state offenders. In the reign of
James I., the practice of impeachment was revived and was used with great energy

I
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These abuses were not guarded against in our Constitution by
limiting, defining, or reducing impeachable crimes, since the same
necessity existed here as in England, for the remedy of impeachment, but by other safeguards thrown around it in that instrument.
It will be observed that the "sole power of impeachment" is conferred on the House, and the sole power of trial, on the Senate
by Art. 1, §§ 2 and 3. These are the only jurisdictionalclauses,
and they do not limit impeachment to crimes or misdemeanors.
Nor is it elsewhere so limited; Sec. 4 of Art. 2 only makes it
imperative when "the President, Vice-President, and all civil
officers" are convicted "of treason, bribery, or other high' crimes
and misdemeanors," that they .' shall be removed from office." 2
But it is not material whether the words "treason, bribery, or
other high crimes and misdemeanors" confer, or limit, jurisdiction,
or only prescribe an imperative punishment as to officers or a
class of cases, since every act which by parliamentary usage is
impeachable is defined a "high crime or misdemeanor ;" and
these are the words of the -British Constitution which describe
impeachable conduct.3
by the Commons, both as an instrument of popular power and -for the furtherance
of public justice.
"Between the year 1620, when Sir Giles Mompesson and Lord Bacon were impeached, and the revolution in 1688, there were about forty cases of impeachment.
In the reigns of William III., Queen Anne, and George L, there were fifteen; and
in the reign of George II., none but that of Lord Lovat, in 1746, for high treason.
The last memorable cases are those of Warren Hastings in 1788, and Lord Melville in 1805 :" May on Parliament 49-50; Ingersoll's Speech on Blount's Trial,
Wharton's State Trials 285; 4 Hatsell, passim.
I The word "high" applies as well to "misdemeanors"
as to "crimes :" 2
Chase's Trial 383.
2 On Chase's Trial, Mr. Rodney so argued. And so Wickliffe on Peek's Trial
309. In Bloaunt's Trial, Mr. Ingersoll insisted that Art. 2, § 4, designates 11the
extent of the power of impeachment both as to the offences and the persons liable:"
Wharton's State Trials 289. See p. 99, per Harper.
a 4 Hatsell's Precedents 73-76.
By the Constitution of Massachusetts the Senate is "to hear and determine all
impeachments made by the House of Representatives against any officer or officers
of the Commonwealth for misconduct and maladministration in office."
On the trial of Judge Prescott, in 1821, Mr. Blake in defence, referring to the
words misconduct and ,maladministration,said :-" What then are the legal import
and signification of these terms ? We answer precisely the same as of crimes and
misdemeanors; that they are in every respect equivalent to the more familiar terms
that are employed by the Constitution of Great Britain in its description of impeachable offences, subject only to the wholesome limitation which in this Commonwealth
confines this extraordinary method of trial to the official misdemeanors of public
functionaries :" Prescott's Trial 117-118.

THE LAW OF IMPEACHMENT.

As these words are copied by our Constitution from the British
Constitutional and Parliamentary Law, they are, so far as applicable to our institutions and condition, to be interpreted, not by
1
English municipal law, but by the lex parliamentaria.
2
When, therefore, Blackstone says that "an impeachment
before the lords by the commons of Great Britain in parliament,
is a prosecution of the already-known and established law, and
has been frequently put in practice," he must he understood to
refer to the "established' ? parliamentary,not common municipal
law, as administered in the ordinary courts, for it was the former
that had been frequently put in practice.
-Whatever "crimes and misdemeanors" were the subjects of
impeachment in England prior to the adoption of our Constitution,
and as understood by its framers, are therefore subjects of impeachment before the Senate of the United States, subject only
to the limitations of the Constitution.
The framers of our Constitution, looking to the impeachment
trials of England, and to the writers on parliamentary and common law, and to the constitutions and usages of our own states,
saw that no Act of Parliament or of any state legislature ever
undertook to define an impeachable crime. They saw. that the
whole system of crimes, as defined in Acts of Parliament and as
recognised at common law, was prescribed for and adapted. to
the ordinary courts.
They saw that the high court of impeachment took jurisdiction
of cases where no indictable crime had been commitfed, in many
instances, and there were then, as there yet are, "two parallel
modes of reaching'" some, but not all, offenders; one by impeachment, the other by indictment.
In such cases, a party first indicted "may be impeached afterI Pennock v. Dtalogue, 2 Peters 2-18. When foreign statutes are "adopted
into our legislation the known and setled construction of those statutes by courts
of law has been considered as silently incorporated into the acts :" United States
ve.Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. R.209; Ex parte Hall, 1 Pick. 261 ; Sedgwick on Stat.
262,426 ; Story on Const. § 797; Rawle on Const. 200. This author says in
reference to impeachments, "We must have recourse to the common law of England for the definition of them"-that is, to the common parliamentary law.
9 4 Blackstone's Com. 260, read in Oxford 1758. Ie says, also, "It may happen that a subject intrusted with the administration of public affairs may infringe
the rights of the people and be guilty of such crimes as the ordinary magistrate
either dares not or cannot punish"-that is, cannot punish because not falling
within his jurisdiction.
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wards, and the latter trial may proceed notwithstanding the indictment.1 On the other hand, the King's Bench held in Fitzharris'sCase that an impeachment was no answer to an indictment
in that court. 2
The two systems are in no way connected, though each may
adopt principles applicable to the other, and each may iahine by
the other's borrowed light.
With these landmarks to guide them, our fathers adopted a
Constitution under which official malfeasance and nonfeasance,
and, in some cases, misfeasance, may be the subject of impeachment, although not made criminal by Act of Congress or so
recognised by the common law of England or of any state of the
Union. They adopted impeachment as a means of removing men
from office whose misconduct imperils the public safety, and renders them unfit to occupy official position.
All this is supported by the elementary writers, both English
and American, on parliamentary and common law; by the English and American usage in cases of impeachment; by the opinions of the framers of the Constitution.; by contemporaneous
construction, all uncontradicted by any authbr, authority, case,
or jurist, for more than three-quarters. of a century after the
adoption of the Constitution.
The authorities are abundant to show that the phrase "high
crimes and misdemeanors," as used in the British and our Constitution, are not limited to crimes defined by statute or as
recognised at common law.
Christian, who may be supposed to have understood the British
Constitution when he wrote, says: "When the words .igh orimeg
and misdemeanors are used in prosecutions by impeachment, the
words high crimes have no definite signification, but are used
merely to give greater solemnity to the charge." 3
Wooddeson whose lectures were read at Oxford in 1777,
declared that impeachments extended to cases of which the ordinary courts had no jurisdiction. He says: "Magistrates and
officers * * may abuse their delegated powers to the extensive
detriment of the community, and at the same time in a manner
IStafford's Trial, 7 Howard's State Trials 1297.
2 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 262.

3 Note to 4 Blackstone 5.
4 2 Wooddeson's Lectures 596.
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not.properly cognizable before the ordinary tribunals." And he
pr(.3 eeds to say the remedy is by impeachment.
English history presents many examples of this kind.'
I See Comyn's Digest, tit. Parliament. "In 1388 there are several proceedings
before the lords against the Archbishop of York and other great officers and against
several of the judges, for having given extrajudicial opinions and misinterpreting
the law:" 4 Hatsel 76; and in a note it is said the lords determined that such cases
"cannot be tried elsewhere than in Parliament,nor by any other law than the law
and course of Parliament." * *
It is elsewhere said, "such kind of misdeeds as peculiarly injure the common-wealthby the abuse of high offices of trust are the most proper * * grounds for
this kind of prosecutions. Thus * * if the judges mislead their sovereign by unconstitutional opinions, if any other magistrate attempt to subvert the fundamental
laws or introduce arbitrary power. * * So when a lord chancellor has been thought
to put the seal to an ignominious treaty; a lord admiral to neglect the safeguard
of the sea; an ambassador to betray his trist; a privy counsellor to propound or
support pernicious and dishonorable measures, &c., &c. :" 2 Wooddeson's Lectures 602.
In Ohio, before it was settled that the courts had power to declare legislative
acts unconstitutional, one Judge of the Supreme Court and one President Judge
of the Common Pleas were tried on impeachments for the exercise of this power,
and each escaped conviction by only one vote: 20 Ohio Rep. Appendix, p. 3.
"The Duke of Suffolk was impeached for neglect of duty as an ambassador;
the Earl of Bristol that he gave counsel against a war with Spain, whose king had
affronted the English nation; the Duke of Buckingham that he, being admiral,
neglected the safeguard of the sea; Michael de la Pole that he, being chancellor,
acted contrary to his duty; the Duke of Buckingham for having a plurality of
office; and he whom the poet calls the 4greatest, "wisest, meanest of mankind,' for
bribery in his office of lord chancellor; the Lord Finch for unlawful methods of
enlarging the forest, in his office of assistant to the justices on Eyre; the Earl of
Oxford for selling goods to his own use captured by him as admiral without
accounting for a tenth to others :" Ingersoll's Speech on Blount's Trial, Wharton's
State Trials 291.
Dr. Sacheverel was impeached for preaching an improper sermon: Harper's
Speech Blount's Trial, Wharton 301.
"Andrew Home in his Mirrour of Justice mentions many judges punished by
King Alfred before the Conquest for corrupt judgments. * * Our stories mention
many punished in the time of Edward I.; our Parliament rolls of Edward IiD.s
time; of Richard U.'s time for the pernicious resolutions given at Nottingham
Castle, afford examples of this kind. In later times the Parliament journals of 18
& 21 Jac., the judgment of the ship-money in the time of Charles I., questioned
and the particular judges impeached :'" Vaugh. 139 ; cited in Appendix to Addison's (Pa.) Trial.
Lord Viscount Melville was tried on an impeachment for that as treasurer of the
navy he usedfor purposes of private gain the public money not with intent to defraud
the government out of any part of it.
The defence was that he had a right to use it.
The lords submitted to the judges of the Common Pleas questions,
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Indeed, the word "misdemeanor" has a common-law, a parliamentary, and a popular sense. In the parliamentary sense, as
applied to officers, it means "maladministration" or "misconduct," not necessarily indictable,' not only in England, but in
the United States. 2 Demeanor is conduct, and he is guilty of
1. Whether it was unlawful to draw public money in advance of the time it was
needed for public use, but for the purpose of having it for that use ?
2. If such act was an offence?
The judges answered each in the negative. The questions imply that if it had
been either unlawful or a crime the impeachment would lie: 29 Howell's State Tr.
1469.
But this case was after the adoption of our Constitution, and can, therefore, throw
but little light on its meaning.
"" On the 16th of October 1667, the House being informed that there have been
some innorationsof late in trials of men for their lives and deaths, and in some particular cases restraints have been put upon juries, in the inquiries--this matter is
referred to a committee. On the 18th of November this committee are empowered
to receive information against the Lord Chief Justice Kelynge, for any other MISDEN.AxORs besides those concerning juries, and on the lith of December 1667,
this committee report several resolutions against the Lord Chief Justice Kelynge,
of illegal and arbitraryproceedings in his office. The first of these resolutions is,
that the proceedings of the Lord Chief Justice in the cases njow reported are innovations in the trial of men for their lives and liberties; and that he hath used an arbitrary and illegal power, which is of dangerous consequence to the lives and liberties
of the people of England, and tends to the introducing of an arbitrary government.
The Lord Chief Justice hath undervalued, vilified, and contemned Magna Charta,
the great preserver of our lives, freedom, and property:" 4 Hatsel Free. 113;
cited 2 Chase's Trial 461.
One of tie resolves against Chief Justice Scroggs was, "1That the discharging
the grand jury by the Court of King's Bench in Trinity Term last, before they had
fnished their presentments, was illegal, arbitrary, and an high misdemeanor:" 4
-iatsel 127 ; 7 State Trials 479.
"lisprisions which are merely positive are generally denominated contempts or
Ligh misdemeanors, of which:"1. The first and principal is the maladministration of such high offices as are in
r-iblic trust and employment. This is usually punished by the method of parlia-ientary impeachment :" 4 Blackst. 121.
2 In Senate, July 8th 1797, it was "1Resolved, that William Blount, Esq., one
:'f the Senators of the United States, having been guilty of a high misdemeanor,
entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator, be and he hereby
:s expelled from the Senate of the United States :" Wharton's State Trials 202.
He was not guilty of an indictable crime: Story on Const., § 799, note.
The offence charged, Judge SToity remarks, "was not defined by any statute of
the United States. It was an attempt to seduce a United States Indian interpreter
from his duty, and to alienate the affections and conduct of the Indians from the
public officers residing among them."
Blackstone says :--" The fourth species of offence more immediately against thd
king and government are entitled misprisions and contempts. Misprisions are in the
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misdemeanor who misdemeans or misconducts. The power of impeachment, so far as the President is concerned, was inserted in
the Constitution to secure "good behavior," to punish "misconduct," to defend "the community against the incapacity,
negligence, or perfidy of the chief magistrate," to punish "abus e
of power," "treachery," "corrupting his electors " or, as Madison declared, "for any act which might be called a misdemeanor." I And Mr. Madison afterwards maintained that "the
acceptation of our law generally understood to be all such high offences as are
under the degree of capital, but nearly bordering thereon. * * Misprisions which
are merely positive are generally denominated contempts or high misdemeanors, of
which the first and principal is the maladministrationof such high offices as are in
public trust and employment. This is usually punished by the method of parliaazentary impea6l7zent :" Vol. 4, p. 121.
See'Prescott's Trial, Massachusetts, 1821, pp. 79-80, 109, 117-20,172-180, 191.
On Chase's Trial, the defence conceded that "to misbehave or to misdemean is
precisely the same:" 2 Chase's Trial 145.
1 From 2 Madison's Papers 1153, &c.
July 20th 1787.
The following clause relative to the President being under consideration:"To be removable on impeachment and conviction for malpractice or neglect
of duty."
Mr. Pinckney moved to strike this out and said: ," He ought not to be impeachable while in office."
Mr. Darce: If he be not impeachable whilst in office he will spare no efforts
or means whatever to get himself re-elected. He considered this as an essential
security for the GOOD BE HAViO of the Executive.
"Mr. Wilson concurred."Mr. Gouverneur Morris: He can do no criminal act without oadjutors, who
may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that will be a sufficient proof
of his innocence. Besides, who is to impeach? Is the impeachment to slispend
his functions ? If it is not the mischief will go on.
"Colonel Mason : No point is of more importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above justice? Above all, shall that
man be above it who can commit the most extensive injustice?
"Dr. Franklin was for retaining the clause as favorable to the Executive.
History furnishes one example only of, a first magistrate being formally brought to
public justice. .Everybody cried out against this as unconstitutional. What was
the practice before this in cases where the chief magistrate rendered himself obnoxious ? Why, recourse was had to assassination, in which he was not only deprived
of his life, but of the opportunity of vindicating his character. It would be the
best way, therefore,.to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of
the Executive where his MISCONDUCT should deserve it, and for his honorable
acquittal where he should be unjustly accused.
"G. Morris admits corruption and some few other offences to be such as ought
to be impeachable, but thought the cases ought to be enumerated and defined.
"Mr. Madison thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for
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wanton removal of meritorious offcers would subject him [the
President] to impeachment and removal from his own high
trust."'
defending the community against the incapacity, neglkqence, or perfidy of the chief
magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his
administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his
trust to foreign powers. * * * In the case of the executive magistrate, which was
to be administered by a single man, los&of capacity or corruption was more within
the compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.
"Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of impeachments. A good magistrate will not
fear them. A bad one ought to be kept in fear of them. He hoped the maxim
would never be adopted here that the chief magistrate could do no wrong.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

" M r. Randolph: The propriety of impeachments was a favorite principle with
him. Guilt wherever found ought to be punished. The executive will have great
opportunities of abusing his power; particularly in time of war.
"G. Morris:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
The executive ought to be impeachable for treachery. Corrupting his electors
and incapacity were other causes of impeachment. For the latter he should be
punished not as a man but as an officer, and punished only by degradation from his
office.
"The proposition was agreed.to by a vote of eight states to two."
September 8th 1787.
From 3 Madison's Papers 1528.
1The clause referring to the Senate the trial of impeachment against the President for treason and bribery was taken up.
"Colonel Mason: Why is the provision restrained to treason and bribery?
Treason, as defined in the Constitution, will not reach many great and dangerous
offences. Hastings is not guilty of treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution
may not be treason as above defined. As bills of attainder, which have saved the
British Constitution, are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend the power of
impeachments.
"He moved to add after ' bribery,' 'or maladministration.'
"Mr. Madison : So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.
"Colonel Mason withdrew I maladministration,' and substituted I other high
crimes and misdemeanors against the state.'
"Agreed to, eight states to three.
IIMr. Madison objected to the trial of the President by the Senate, especially
as he was to be impeached by the other branch of the legislature; and for any act
which might be called a misdemeanor. The President, under these circumstances,
was made improperly defendant. He would prefer the Supreme Court for the trial
of impeachments.
Mr. Williamson thought there was more danger of too much lenity than of
MC
too much rigor.
I On die 16th June 1789, on the bill to establish a department of foreign affairs,
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The Constitution declares that, "the judges, both of the
Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their commissions during
good behavior." 1
By a public law every judge is required. to take an oath as
follows:
"I do solemnly swear, that I will administer justice without
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich ;
and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform
all the duties incumbent -,n me as judge, &c., according to the
best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States: so help. me God. " '
-By another public law-the Constitution-the President is
required to take an oath, that he will "faithfully execute the
office, of President of the United States, and will to the best of
his ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States."
These oaths are public laws defining duties, and a violation of
them is an impeachable misdemeanor, for Judge Blackstone
Mr. Madison" said in Congress :-" Perhaps the great danger * * of abuse in the
executive power lies in the improper continuance of bad men in office. But the
power we contend for will not enable him to do this; for if an unworthy man be
continued in office by an unworthy President, the House of Representatives can at
any time impeach him, and the Senate can remove him whether the President
chooses or not. The danger $hen consists merely in this--the President can displace from office a man whose merits require that he should be continued in it.
What will be the motives which the President can feel for such abuse of his power
and .the restraints that operate to prevent it ? In the first place, he will be
impeachable by the House before the Senate for such an act of maadministration;
for I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to
impeachment and removal from his own high trust :" 4-Elliott's Debates 380.
1 A statute of Henry VIII., providing for the appointment of a custos rotuloruia
and clerk of the peace for the several counties of England, provides that the custos
shall hold his office until removed, and the clerk of the peace durante se bene
gesserit. It recites that ignorant persons had got in by unfair means. And so is
the tenure of judges in England by the Declaration of Right. The tenure durante,
&c., was introduced to enable a removal to be made for misbehavior: 2 Chase's
'Trial 337. By Act of 13 Win. 3, c. 2, s. 3, the commission of-every judge runs
"qunaidiu se bene gesserit:" 2 Chase's Trial 255, 336, 342, 386; see p. 145
Peck's Trial 427, where Buchanan said: "Judges hold during good behaviorofficial misbehavior is impeachable. What is misbehavior ? We are bound to prove
that the respondent has violated the Constitution or some known law of the land.
This was the principle deduced from Chase's Trial, in opposition to the principle
* that in order to render an officer impeachable he must be indictable."
2 Act of September 24th 1789, 1 Stat. 76 ; Chase's Trial 402.
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says: "A crime or misdemeanor is an act committed or omitted
in violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding
it." I
The Constitution contains inherent evidence, therefore, that as
to judges they should be impeachable when their behavior was not
good-and the Senate are made the exclusive judges of what is
bad behavior.
The words "good behavior" are borrowed from the English
laws, and have been construed there in a way to enlarge the
scope of impeachment to a wide range. They were first introduced into an English statute to procure the removal of officers
who, on trial, might prove too ignorant to perform their duties.
These general views are sustained by the opinions of the
framers of the Constitution, declared by themselves in convention, by Madison, 2 in the Virginia Convention of 1788, and by
Alexander Hamilton 3 in the Federalist, who says: that "several
I IIAt common law an ordinary violation of a public statute, even by one not in
office, though the statute in terms provides no punishment, is an indictable misdemeanor :" Bishop's MS. letter to a member of the Judiciiry Committee, citing I
Bishop Cr. Law, 3d ed., sec. 187, 535.
2 " Were the President to commit anything so atrocious as to summon only a few
states [to consider a treaty], he would be impeached and convicted, as a majority of
the states would be affected by his misdemeanor."
And again :"Mr. Madison, adverting to 3Ir. Masonrs objection to the President's power of
pardoning, said it would be extremely improper to vest it in the House of Representatives, and not much less so to place it in the Senate; because numerous bodies
were actuated more or less by passion, and might in the moment of vengeance forget humanity. It was an established practice in Massachusetts for the legislature
to determine in such cases.
"It was found, says he, that two different sessions, before each of which the
question came, with respect to pardoning the delinquents of the rebellion, were
governed precisely by different sentiments-the one would execute with universal
vengeance, and the other would extend general mercy.
"1There is one security in this case to which gentlemen may not have adverted:
If the President be connected in any suspicious manner with any persons, and there
be grounds to believe he will shelter himself, the House of Representatives can impeach him; they can remove him if found guilty; they can suspend him when suspected, and the power will devolve on the Vice-President. Should he be suspected
also, hemay likewise be suspended till he be impeached and removed, and the
legislature shall make a temporary appointment. This is a great security :"
Debates of the Virginia Convention, printed at the Enquirer Press for Richey,
Worsley & Augustine Davis, 1805, pp. 353-4.
a In the Federalist, No. 65, he says
"The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which proceed from the mis-
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of the state constitutions have followed the example" of Great
Britain.
And up to that time, the state constitutions had
adopted the British system with only some modifications; but
none of them recognising the'idea, that impeachment was limited
to indictable acts,. but all affirming, "that the subjects of this
jurisdiction were offences of a political niture." 1 Some of these
conduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some
public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society
itself."
"What," it may be asked, "is the true spirit of the institution itself ? Is it not
designed as a method of national inquest into the conduct of public min ? If this
be the.design of itwho can so properly be the inquisitors. for the nation as the
repres.entatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of
originating the.inqiry, or, in other words,-of preferring the impeachment, ought
to be lodged in one branch of the legislative body; will not the reasons which
indicate the propriety of this arrangement strongly plead for an admission of the
other branch of that body to a share of the inquiry ? The model from which the
idea of this institution has been borrowed pointed out that course to the convention.
In Great Britain it is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment and of-the House of L6rds to decide upon it. Several of the state constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter as the former seem to have
regarded the practice of impeachments as a bridle in the hands of thd legislative
body upon the executive servants of the Government. Is not this the true light in
which it is to be regarded ?"
' To what extent this writer contemplated the exertion of this power is not left
in doubt. In the succeeding number of the same-commentary he observes:
'! The Convention might with propriety have meditated the punishlment of the
executive for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate or a want of integrity
in the conduct of the negotiations committed to him," clearly not statutory offences.
" Thus, in that of Virginia, established in 1776, is seen this provision: "The
governor when he is out of office, and others offending against the state, either by
maladministration, corruption, or other means, shall be impeachable by the House
of Delegates." In the same year, in the succeeding month, Delaware provided in
her constitution that "the President when he is out of office, and eighteen months
thereafter, and all others offending against the state, either by maladministration,
corruption, or other means, by which the safety of the Commonwealth may be endangered, shall be impeachable by the House of Assembly." So,-North Carolina,
two months later, provided in her constitution: 6 The governor and other officers.
offending against the state by violating any part of this constitution, maladministration, or corruption, may be prosecuted on the impeachment of the General
Assembly, or presentment of the grand jury of any court of supreme jurisdiction
in this state."
The Constitution of Connecthcut is stated to contain a provision "1to call to
account for any misdemeanor and maladministration." That of New York provides: "The power of impeaching all officers of the state for mal and corrupt conduct in their respective offices is vested in the representatives of the people in
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constitutions limited impeachment to "mal and corrupt conduct
in office," or as in the New York Constitution of 1777, to "venal
and corrupt conduct in office ;" while the Constitution of the
United States discarded all these limitations, and gave the power
in the broadest terms. It is said this provision in the Constitution of the United States was copied from that of New York.'
If so, the change in phraseology is significant.
These general views are supported by the elementary writers
without exception, up to the last year.
Curtis, in his History of the Constitution,2 says: "Although an
impeachment may involve an inquiry, whether a crime against
any positive law has been committed, yet it is not necessarily a
trialfor crime, nor is there any necessity, in the case of crimes
committed by public officers, for the institution- of any special
proceeding fir the infliction of the punishment prescribed by the
laws, since they, like all other persons, are amenable to the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts of justice, in respect of offences
against positive law. The purposes of an impeachment lie wholly
beyond the penalties of the statute or the customary law. The
object of the proceeding is to.ascertain whether cause exists for
removing a public officerfrom office. Such a cause may be found
in the fact, that either in the discharge of his office, or aside
from its functions, he has violated a law, or committed what is
technically denominated a crime. But a cause for removal from
Assembly," and the trial is declared to be for "crimes and misdemeanors." So,
in the elaborate constitution of .massachusetts, the eighth article declares, "the
Senate shall be a court with full authority to hear and determine all impeachments
made by the House of Representatives against any officer or officers of the Commonwealth for misconduct and maladministration in their offices." Hence, it will
be remarked, that in all of the state constitutions to which we have had access, formed
prior to that of the United States, the impeachable offences are of a nature which
In neither of them are
may with peculiar propriety be denominated "political."
the subjects of impeachment mere "4statutory offences." This minute recurrence
to the constitutions of several states will not be deemed inappropriate when it is
remembered that they are not only the most authentic evidence of the public sense
of our country at an early period, but because in the formation of the Federal
Constitution their provisions should have a controlling influence on the minds of
their delegates to the general convention, seeking to commend it to their adoption
by engrafting into it parts of their own systems, and thus imparting to it the wellascertained spirit and prudence of those who, if adopted, were to be its constituents :"
From an able article by John C. Hamilton, Esq.
I Vol. 6 Am. Law Beg. N. S. 277 ; Wharton's State Trials 287.
9 Curtis's list, of Const. 260-1 ; 5 Elliot 507-529.

THE LAW OF IMPEACHMENT.

office may exist where no offence against positive law has been
committed, as where the individual has from immorality or imbecility or maladministration become unfit to ezercise the office.
The rules by which an impeachment is to be determined are
therefore peculiar, and are not fully embraced by those principles
or provisions of law which courts of ordinary jurisdiction are
required to administer."
Story says:1 "Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion that no previous statute is necessary to iiuthorize an
impeachment for any official misconduct.

*

*

*

In the few

bases of impeachment which have hitherto been tried, no one of
the charges has-rested uponi any statutable misdemeanors. * **
The reasoning by which the power of the House of Representatives- to punish for contempts (which are breaches of privilege
and offences not defined by any positive laws) has "been upheld
by the Supreme Court, stands upon similar grounds; for if the
House had no jurisdiction to punish for contempts until the acts
had been previously defined and ascertained by positive law, it is
clear that the process of arrest would be illegal:" Denn v.
Anderson, 6 Wheat. 204.
"In examining the parliamentary history of impeachments, it
will be found that many offences not-easily definable by law, and
many of a purely political character, have been deemed high
crimes and misdemeanors worthy of this extraordinary remedy." 2
"There are many'offences purely political which lave been
held to be within the reach of parliamentary impeachments, not
one of which is in the slightest manner alluded to in our statute
books. And, indeed, political offences are of so various and
complex a character, so utterly incapable of being defined or
classified, that the task of positive legislation would be impracticable if it were not almost absurd to attempt it. What for
instance could positive legislation do. in cases of impeachment
like the charges against Warren Hastings in 1788 ? Resort then
must be had either to parliamentary practice, and the common
law, in order to ascertain what are high crimes and misdemeanors;
"1 Story on Const. § 799. In a note he says: "1It may be supposed that the
first charge in the articles of impeachment againstWilliam Blount was a statutable
offence; but on an accurate examination of the Act of Congress of 1796, it will
be found not to have been so."
I Story on Coast. § 800. Ile proceeds to cite numerous cases.
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or the whole subject must be left to the arbitrary discretion of the
Senate for the time being. The latter is so incompatible with the
genius of our institutions, that no lawyer or statesman would be
inclined to countenance so absolute a despotism of opinion and
practice, which might make that a crime at one time or in one person which would be deemed innocent at another time or in another
person. The only safe guide in such cases must be the common
law. * * And however much it may fall in with the political
theories of certain statesmen and jurists to deny the existence of
a common law belonging to and applicable to the nation in ordinary cases, no one has as y]et been bold enough to assert that the
power of impeachment is limited to offences positively defined in
the statute book of the Union, as impeachable high crimes and
misdemeanors." I
Rawle, in his work on the Constitution, says: The delegation
of important trusts affecting the higher interests of society, is
always from various causes liable to abuse. The fondness frequently felt for the inordinate extension of power, the influence
of party and of prejudice, the seductions of foreign* states, or.
the baser appetite for illegitimate emolument, are sometimes pro
ductions of what are not inaptly termed political offences (Feder
alist, No. 65), which it would .be difficult to take cognisance of in.
the ordinary course of judicial proceeding.
"The involutions and varieties of vice are too many and, too
artful to be anticipated by positive law :" Rawle on Const. 200.
"In general those offences which may be committed equally by'
a private person as by a,public officer are not the subjects of'
impeachment:" Id. 204.
"We may perceive in this scheme one useful mode of'removingfrom office him who is unworthy to fill it, in cases where the
people and sometimes the President himself would be unable to.
accomplish that object :" Id. 208.
Chancellor KENT, in discussing the subject of impeachment,.
"
says ."
The Constitution has rendered him [the President] directly
amenable by law for maladministration. The inviolability of any
officer of government is incompatible with the republican theory
as well as with the principles of retributive justice.
"If the President will use the authority of his station to
I I Story on Const. § 797.
VOL. XV.-42
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violate the Con.stitution or law of the land, the House of Representatives can arrest him in his career by resorting to the power
of impeachment :" 1 Kent's Com. 289.
Neither in Congress nor in.any state has any statute been proposed to define impeachable crimes: so uniform has been thd
opinion that none was necessary, even in those states, few in
number, where common-law crimes do not exist.
The assertion, "that' unless the crime is specifically named in.
the Constitution, impeachments, like indictments, can only be
instituted for crimes. committed against the statutory law of the.
United States," is a view not yet- a year old, which has not
been held at any prior time, either in England-or America.
It would certainly seem clear, that impeachments are not
necessarily limited to acts indictable by statute or common law,
and that it would be impossible for human prescience or foresight
to define in advance by statute the necessary subjects of impeachment. The Constitution contemplated no such absurd impossibility. It may be said there is danger in leaving to the Senate.
a power so undefined. It was because of this danger, that the.
power has been limited as it is by the Constitution, and experience;
has shown that the limitations are more than sufficient.
The whole system of common-law crimes as it exists in Eng.
land, and in almost every state of the Union, is the result of a:
judicial power equally andefined.
The system of impeachment -is to be governed by great general
principles of right, and it is less probable the Senate will depart
from these, than that the whole legislature would in the enactment,
2
of a law, or than courts in establishing the common law.
' Vol. 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 269.
2 On the trial of Judge Prescott, in Massachusetts, in 1821, Mr. Shaw said:
€CThe security of our rights depends rather upon the general tenor and character
than upon particular provisions of o,;r Constitution. The love of freedom and
jstice-so deeply engraven upon the hearts of the people, and interwoven in.the
whole texture of our social institutions-a thorough and intelligent acquaintance
with their rights, and a firm determination to maintain them-in short, those moral
and intellectual qualities without which social liberty cannot exist, and over which
despotism can obtain no control-these stamp the character and give security to
the rights of the free people of this Commonwealth. *
*
* .But it has not
been, and it cannot be, contended, that in its decisions and adjudications this court
is not governed by established laws. These may be positive and express,'or they
may depend upon reasoning and analogy. It would be idle to expect a rule applicable to every case, in the text of the statute-book. Laws are founded on certain
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The Constitution contains inherent evidence that the indictable
character of an act does not define its impeachable quality. It
enumerates the classes of cases in which legislative power may be
exercised, and it defines the class of persons and cases to which
the judicial power extends; but there is no such enumeration of
impeachable cases, though there is of persons.
In England and some of the states, the power of removal of
officers by the executive on the address or request of the legislature exists, but the Constitution made no provision for this as to
any officer, manifestly because the power of impeachment extended
to every proper casefor removal.
As to the President and Vice-President, there ig this provision,
that "Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation, or inability, * declaring what officer' shall then
act * * until the disability be removed or a President shall b&
elected:" Art.-2, § 1.
It has already been shown that the framers of the Constitution:
regarded the power of impeachment as a fieans of defefiding "the'
community against the incapacity" of officers.' This clause of
the Constitution recognised the same view, Art. 2, § 1: ,"Congress may by law provide for the case of i * inability, both of the'
President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then
act-as President, and such officer shall act accordingly" until the
disability be removed or a President shall be elected."
This and the power of impeachment are the only. modes of
getting rid of officers whose inability from insanity-or otherwise,
renders them unfit to hold :office, and whose every official act will
necessarily be misdemeanor. As to the President and Vice'
President, it was necessary to give Congress the power to'designate a successor, and so to determine the disability. As to all
other officers, the Constitution or laws define the mode of designating a successor, and it is left to the impeaching power to remove
in cases of insanity or misdemeanor arising from that or other
cause. It cannot be supposed the whole nation must suffer with
out remedy, if the whole Supreme Court or other officers should
become utterly disabled from the performance of their duties.
general principles, and the relations of men in society. It is the province of this
court, as of ell other judicial tribunals, to search out and apply these principles to
the particular cases in judgment before them."
And see 4 Howard's St. Trials

47, per Selden; 6 Am. Law Reg. No S. 264.
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Such an occurrence is within the range of possibility, if not
probability.
In our system it is utterly impossible to apply any test of common law or statutory criminality. The Supreme Court, without
much consideration, has determined that the national courts have
never been clothed with jurisdiction of common-law crimes.
When the Constitution was adopted, all the states recognised
common-law crimes, and those added since do so with few exceptions. But there is something peculiar to.each and different from
all others in its common-law crimes, growing out of the rulings
of judges or its condition, and in all, statutes have made changes,
so that no two states recognise the same crimes.
The Constitution authorizes Congress "to provide for the
punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of
the United States. *

*

*

•

*

To define and punish piracies

and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the
law of nations," but nowhere declares they may define impeachable crimes, for the very good reason that common parliamentary
law, subject, like the common lawi to be moulded to circumstances
and adapted to times, had already sufficiently defined them.
Congress cannot by any law abridge the right of the House to
impeach or the Senate to try.
When the Constitution confers on the House the "sole power
of impeachment," and .on the Senate "1the sole power of trial,"
these are independent powers, not to be controlled by- the joint
opinion of the two houses, previously incorporated 'into -a law.'
Suppose such a law passed. It cannot be repealed. over a veto
except by a two-thirds vote in each house. Yet a majority may
impeach; and, after the veto of a repealing law, can that majbrity
be denied the constitutional privilege conferred on them?
"Treason, briberiy, and other high crimes and misdemeanors"
are of course impeachable. Treason and bribery are specifically
named. But "other high crimes and misdemeanors" are just as
fully comprehended as though each were specified. The Senate
is made the sole judge of what they are. There is no revising
court. The Senate determines in the light of parliamentary law.
Congress cannot define or limit by law that which the Constitution defines in two cases by enumeration, and in others by classiThe Pariameent c-innot by any act restrain the power of a subsequent Parliament :," 4 ust. 42; : Com. Dig. 301.
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fication, and of which the Senate is sole judge. It has never
been pretended that treason and bribery would not be impeachable if not made criminal by statute or so recognised by national
common law. They are impeachable because enumerated. Other
high crimes and misdemeanors are equally designated by classification.
Suppose the Constitution had declared "that all persons committing ' treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors'
shall be punished by indictment in the courts of. the United
States," can it be doubted that every crime and misdemeanor
recognised by the common law would be the subject of indictment? "This would be by force of the Constitution employing
the words crimes and misdemeanors; for these are words known
to the common law, and it is a universal principle of interpretation, acted on in all the courts, that a common-law term employed
in conferring jurisdiction on courts is to bear its common-law
meaning."
Now, when the Constitution says that all civil officers shall be
removable on impeachment for high crimes aiyd misdemeanors,
and the Senate shall have .the sole power of trial, the jurisdiction
is conferred, and its scope is defined by common parliamentary
law.
The national courts do not take jurisdiction of common-law
crimes, not because common-law crimes do not exist, but because
their jurisdiction is only such as is expressly conferred on them,
and no statute has conferred the jurisdiction. But in the District
of Columbia, under national jurisdiction, common-law crimes and
jurisdiction of them in the courts do exist.
In addition to this, there are crimes exclusively of national
jurisdiction, and others exclusively of state cognisance. The
murder of citizens in a state is not and cannot be made criminal
by Act of Congress, where it is not perpetrated in the denial of a
national right. The states alone provide for this and many other
offences. And, in the states not recognising common-law crimes,
they may omit to make homicide a-penal offence as to Indians,
negroes, or others, if the legislature so determine, in the absence
of a law of Congress similar to the "Civil Rights" Act.'
I Act of April 9th 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
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If no act is impeachable which is not made criminal, then its
criminality must depend:1. On an Act of Congress defining crimes; or,
2. On acts of state legislatures defining crimes; or,
8. On the definition of common-law crimes in the states ; or,
4. On the common-law crimes existing in England when the
Constitution was adopted.
It is quite clear that national law in some form must control it,
since "the United States' have no concern with any but their own
laws." I
The national government is complete in itself, with powers
2
which neither depend on nor can be abridged-by state laws.
If then impeachment islimited to acts made criminal by a
statute of Congress, an officer of the United States cannot be
impeached, though he should go into the "1Dominion of Canada"
or the "Republic of Mexico," and there stir up insurrection, or
be guilty of violating all the laws of the land; or if he should go
'into a state and violate all of its laws.3 If so, a highway robber
may be resident and he is exempt from impeachment!
It is not possible that a position so monstrous was intended by
1It was said by one of the counsel, that the offence must be a breach either of
the common 1aw, a stat law, or a law of the United States, and that no lawyer
could speak of a misdemea.tr but as an act violating some one of these laws.
This doctrine surely is not warranted, for the Government of the United States
have no concern with any but their own laws. * !*t But as a member of the
House of Representatives,and acting as a manager of an impeachment before the
highest court in the nation, aptS te. to ry the highest officers of the government,
when I speak of a misdemeanor I mean an act of official misconduct, a violation
of official duty, whether it lie a proceeding against a positive law or a proceeding
-unwarranted by law :" per Nicholson arguendo, 2 Chase's Trial 340; per
-Rodney 387.
2 Weston v. (ity.Council of.Qliarleston, 2 Peters 449 ; McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Ban of U. S., 9 Id. 738.
$ Mr. Rodney, in the argument of Chase's Trial, said: "When gentlemen talk
of ani indictment being a necessary substratum of an impeachnient, I should be
.glad to be informed in what caurt it must be supported. In.the Courts of the
United States or in the state courts ? If in the state courts, thin in which of them;
or provided it can be supported in any of them, will the act warrant an impeachient ?' If an indictment must h in the Courts of the United States, in the long
catalogue of crimes there are a very few which an officer might not commit with
impunity. He might be guilty of treason against an individual state; of murder,
arson, forgery, and perjury in various forms, without being amenable to the
Federal jurisdiction, and unless he could be indicted before them he could not be
impeached :" 2 Chase's Trial 389.
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the framers of the Constitution. Nor can the criminal statutes
or common law of the states limit or regulate national impeachable offences. The fact that each state differs from all others in
its laws renders this impossible. It never could have been
designed to control the national power of impeachment by state
laws, ever varying and conflicting as they are.'
If impeachments were limited in England to indictable offences,
as they never have been, it is manifest no such rule can be
adopted here, for we have no uniform and single standard of the
common law as there.
And as the Supreme Court has determined that the commonlaw crimes do not exist in our national system, it cannot be supposed they are more applicable to the Senate than to our ordinary
courts.. We can, therefore, safely adopt the remark of "5the
great SELDEN" on the impeachment of Ratcliffe:

. It were better

to examine this matter according to the rules and foundations
of this House." that is upon the great principles of parliamentary
law adapted to our condition and circunistances, as modified by
the Constitution, giving it a construction equal to every emergency which may call its powers into exercise, and giving in its
construction full effect in Constitutional forms to the maxim it
was designed to make effectual-that the safety of the republic is
3
the supreme law."
If we adopt the test that an act to be impeachable must be
indictable at common law, the Constitution will be practically
nullified on this subject.
I In the argument of Chase's Trial, Mr. Rodney said:

Are we then to resort

to the erring data of the different states I In New Hampshire drunkenness may
be an indictable offence, but not in another state. Shall a United States judge be
impeached and removed for getting intoxicated in New Hampshire, when he may
drink as he pleases in other states with impunity ? In some states witchcraft is a
heinous offence, which subjects the unfortunate person to indictment and punishment ; in other states it is unknown as a crime. A great variety of cases might
be put to expose the fallacy of the principle, and to prove how improper it would
be for this court to be governed by the practice of the different states. The variation of such a cothpass is too great for it to be relied on. This honorable body
must have a standard of their own, which will admit of no change or deviation "
2 Chase's Trial 389.
2 Vol. 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 264; 4 Howard's St. Tr. 47.
2 "It may be alleged that the power of impeachment belongs to the House of
Representatives, and that with a view to the exercise of this power that house have
the right to investigate the conduct of all public officers under the government.
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It is a rule of the common law, "that judges of record are
freed from all presentations whatever except in Parliament, where
they may be punished for anything done by them in such courts
as judges.".
Bishop declares that at common law, "The doctrine appears to
be sufficiently established, that legislators, the judges of our
highest courts, and of all courts of record acting judicially,
jurors, and probably such of the high officers of each of the
governments as are intrusted with responsible discretionary
duties, are not liable to an ordinary criminal process, like an
indictment, for their official doings, however.corrupt :" 1 Bishop's
Crim. Law 915.[862].
"At common law, an ordinary violation of a public statute by
one .not in office, though the statute in terms provides no
punishment, is an indictable misdemeanor:" 1 Bishop 535 [187].
And a similar violation by inferior officers was an indictable
misdemeanor.
"If a public officer intrusted with definite powers, to be exercised for the benefit of the community, wickedly abuses or fraudulently exceeds them, he is punishable by indictment, though no
injurious effects result to any individual from his misconduct :"
Whart. Crim. Law, § 2514.
"Whatever mischievously affects the person or property of
another, or openly outrages decency, or disturbs public order, or
is injurious to public morals, or is a breach of official. duity, when
done corruptly is the subject of indictment:" Whart. § 3.
It may be said the immunity of a judge from indictment, for
his official acts at common law, is placed on grounds of public
This is cheerfully admitted. In such a case the safety of the republic would be the
supreme law; and the.power of the house in the pursuit of this object would penetrate into the most secret recesses of the executive department:" President Polk's
Message, Jour. House Rep., 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 693.
"Salus populi suprema lex :" Broom's Legal Maxims ; Blount's Trial, Whart.
St. Tr. 300, per Blount; Prescott's Trial 181, per Smsw; contra, Blake 116.
1 Hawkins 192, ch. 73, 6; 1 Salk. 396; 2 Wooddeson.'596, 355; Jacob's
Law Die., tit. Judges; 12 Coke 25-6; Hammond v. Howell, 2 !od. 218; loyd
v. Barker, 12 Co. 23-5. "The doctrine which holds a judge exempt from a civil
suit, or indictment for any act done or omitted to be done by him sitting as a
judge, has a deep root in the common law," per KENT : Yates v. Zansing, 5 Johns.
'-91; 9 Id. 395; (,ruing"L-rn
v. Buck-lew, 8 Cow. 178; reck's Trial 492; 2
Chase's Trial 389. But see the ruling of Chief Justice SuIPPEN, referred to in
Addison's (Pa.) Trial 70; 1 Bishop on Crim. Law 915 [362]; 4 Blackst. 121.
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policy, to secure his independence, and that it is the indictable
character of the act, if done by a private individual, which gives
jurisdiction by impeachment. But even this proves that personal
liability to an indictment is no test of impeachability. And in
the nature of things official acts cannot be done by private individuals, so that the indictable character of an act is no test of its
impeachability; and no such test could have entered into the
minds of the framers of the Constitution.
It is a rule of interpretation, that a law or an instrument is not
to be construed so as to make its "effects and consequences"'
absurd, if its language may be fairly understood otherwise.
To permit all acts to escape impeachment unless indictable at
common law,' would lead to consequences the most ruinous and
absurd. 2
I On the trial of Chase Mr. Nicholson said: " You, Mr. President, as VicePresident of the United States, together with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Chief Justice, and the Attorney-General, as commissioners of the sinking fund, have
annually at your disposal $8,000,006, for the purpose of paying the national debt.
If instead of applying it to this public use you should divert it to another channel,
or convert it to your own private uses, I ask if. there is a man in the world who
would hesitate to say, that you ought to be impeached for this misconduct. And
yet there is no court in this country in which you could be indicted for it. Nay,
sir, it would amount to nothing more than a breach of trust, and would not be
indictable under the favorite common law.
I"If a judge should order a cause to be tried with eleven jurors only, surely he
might be impeached for it, and yet I believe there is no court in which he could be
indicted:" 2 Chase's Trial 339.
2 On Chase's Trial Mr. Rodney said: "I think I can put * * striking cases
of misconduct in a judge for which it must be admitted that an impeachment will
lie, though no indictment [at common lav] could be maintained." He puts the.
cases :-if a judge, at the time appointed for court, "should appear and open the
court, and notwithstanding there was pressing business to he done he should proceed knowingly and wilfully to adjourn it until the next stated period." * *
"Suppose he proceeded in the despatch of business, and from prejudice against
one party, or favor to his antagonist, he ordered on the trial of a cause though
legal grounds are exhibited for postponement."
"If when the jury return to the bar to give the verdict, he should knowingly
receive the verdict of a majority."
"1Were a judge to entertain the suitors with a farce or a comedy instead of hearing their causes, and turn a jester or buffoon on the bench, I presume he would
subject himself to an impeachment :" 2 Chase's Trial 390.
ir. Harper, for the defence, practically abandoned the idea that an indictable
offence was necessary. He said: "There are reasons which appear to me unanswerable in favor of the opinion, that no offence is impeachable unless it be also
the proper subject of an indictment. * * I can suppose cases where a judge
ought to be impeached for acts which I am not prepared to declare indictable [at
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If a judge should persistently hear the arguments of one party
to causes privately and Out of court, the evil would become so
intolerable in an officer holding for good behavior, that he should
be removed.
If the President should hold out promises of offices of honor
and trust to the friends of Senators to influence their votes, the
consequences might he so pernicious and corrupting, especially
in an hour of national peril, when a single vote might decide the
life of the government, that the safety of the republic "would
demand impeachment. Such a president would violate his oath
Yfaithfull to execute his duties.
There are many breaches of trust not amounting to felonies,
yet so monstrous as to render those guilty of them totally .unfit
for office.
Nor is it always necessary that an act to be impeachable must
violate a positive law. There are many misdemeanors, in violation of official oaths and of duty alike shocking to the moral sense
of mankind and repugnant to the pure administration of office,
that may violate no pohitive law
common law]. Suppose for instance that a judge should constantly omit to hold
court; or should habitually attend so short a time each day as to render it impossible to despatch the business :" 2 Chase's Trial 255.
Mx. Randolph said: " The President of the United States has a qualified negative on all bills passed by the two Houses of Congress., * * Let us suppose it
exercised indiscriminately, on every act preseited for his acceptance. This
surely would be an abuse of his constitutional power richly deserving impeachment; and yet no man will pretend to say it is an indictable offence:" 2 Chase's
Trial 452; Wickliffe's argument on Peck's Trial 311.
On Peek's Trial, Mr. Wickliffe put additional cases: "9Suppose a judgei-uder
the influence of political feeling shall award to his favorite a new trial, * * against
known law, would this be an indictable offence "
" Suppose a judge * * shall labor for two hours in -abuse upon an unoffending
citizen, whom he has dragged before him:"1 Peck's Trial 310.
" If a head of a department should divert his power and patronage for his personal or political aggrandizement :" fd. 310.
On Peck's Trial Mr. Buchanan said: 'The abuse of a power which has been
given may be as criminal as the usurpation of a power which has.not been granted.
Suppose a man to be indicted for an assault and battery. He is tried and found
guilty ; and the ju.ge without any circumstances of peculiar aggravation having
been shown fines him $1000, and commits him to prison for a year. Now although
the judge may possess the power to fine and imprison for this offence at his discretion, would not this punishment be such an abuse of judicial discretion, and afford
such evidence of the tyrannical and arbitrary exercise of power, as would justify
the House of Representatives in voting an impeachment:" Peck's Trial 427.
1 " There are offences for which an officer may be impeached and against which
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The indiscriminate veto of all bills by the President, his retaining in office men subject to his removal, knowing them to be
utterly incapable of performing the duties of their office, and
other misdemeanors, would manifestly be proper subjects of an
impeachment, for otherwise a wicked, corrupt, or incompetent
foreign minister might embroil the nation in a war imperilling our
existence, to avoid which impeachment might be the only remedy.
The impeachment trials in the United States may be said to
have conclusively settled these questions.'
The first case tried (that of William Blount, a Senator of the
'nited States from Tennessee) simply decided that none but civil
officers can be impeached, and that a Senator is not such civil
officer.* But the articles of impeachment-none of which charged
a statutory crime, and' some certainly no common-law offenceproceeded upon the idea that acts were impeachable 2 which were
there are no known positive laws. It is possible that the day may arrive when a
President of the United States, having some great political object in view, may
endeavor to influence Congress by holding out threats or inducements to them. A
treaty may be made, which the President, with some view, may be extremely
anxious to have ratified. The hope of office may be held out to a Senator; and I
think it cannot be doubted that for this the Prdsident would be liable to impeachment, although there is no positive law forbidding it. Again, Sir, a member of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives may have a very dear friend in office,
and the President may tell him unless you vote for my measures your friend shall
be dismissed. Where is the positive law forbidding this ? yet, where is the man
who would be shameless enough to rise in the face of his country and defend such
conduct, or be bold enough to contend that the President could not be impeached
for it ?" Per Nicholson, 2 Chase' Trial 339, 341. See Peck's Trial 309.
"The abuse of a power given may be as criminal as the usurpation of a power
not granted :" Per Buchanan on Peck's Trial 427.
He supposes the case of a judge having discretionary power to fine and imposing
enormous and unnecessary punishment.
I Those before the Senate of the United States are the cases of,
1. William Blount, a Senator of the United States, July 1797 to January 1798:
Wharton's State Trials 200.
2. John Pickering, District Judge New Hampshire, 1803-4: Annals of Congress,
2 Hildreth's Hist. 518.
3. Samuel Chase, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court United States 1804-5:
Trial of Chase by Smith & Lloyd, 2 vols.
4. James Peck, District Judge Missouri, 1826, 1831 : Peck's Trial by Stasbury,
I vol.
5. West W. Humphreys, District Judge of Tennessee, 1862': Congressional
Globe, vols. 47, 48, 49, 2d Session 37th Congress. See Report No. 44, 2d Session
37th Congress, vol. 3 Reports of Committees.
2 There were five articles:1. That in 1797, Spain owning the Floridas and Louisiana, was at war with
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not indictable;*so much so that nio objection was suggested on
that account.
The next case is that of Judge Pickering,' who was convicted
England, and Senator Blount "cdid conspire and contrive to create, promote, and
set on foot * * in the United States, and to conduct and carry on from thence a
military, hostile expedition against * * the Floridas and Louisiana * * for the
purpose of wresting the same from" Spain, and of conquering the same for Great
Britain, in violation of the obligations of neutrality of the United States.
2. That by the treaty of Octoter 27th 1795, the United States and Spain agreed
to restrain Indian hostilities in the country adjacent to the Floridas, yet Blount, in
1797, "1did conspire and contrive to excite the Creek and Cherokee Indians" in the
United States "1to commence hostilities against the subjects and possessions in the
Floridas and Louisiana, for the purpose of reducing the -same to the 'dominion of
* * Great Britain," in violation of the treaty, the obligations of neutrality, and
his duties as Senator.
3. That Blount in April 1797, to accomplish his designs aforesaid, did " conspire and contrive to alienate the confidence of said Indian tribes" from the United
States Indian agent, "1and to diminish, impair, and destroy" his influence " with
the said Indian tribes, and their friendly intercourse and understanding with him."
4. That Blount, in April 1797, '1 did conspire and contrive to seduce" an Indian
interpreter of the United States with the Indians under a treaty between' them and
the United States, "f Tom his duty, and to engage" him " to assist in the promot ion and execution of his said criminal intentions and conspiracies."
5. That Blount, in April 1797, "1did conspire and contrive to diminish and impair the confidence of said Cherokee nation in the government of the United States,
and to create and foment discontents and disaffection among the said Indians
towards the * * United States in relation to" ascertaining and marking the boundary line between the lands of the Indians and of the United States in pursuance
of a treaty between them.
I The articles charged:1. That the surveyor of the district of New Hampshire did, in the port of Portsmouth, seize the ship Eliza for unlading foreign goods contrary to law, and the
marshal of the district, on 16th of October 1802, by order of Judge Pickering, did
arrest and detain said ship for trial, and the Act of Congress of March.2d 1789,
provides that such ship may, by order of the judge, be delivered to the claimant.
on giving bond to the United States and on producing a certificate from the collector
of the district that the duties on the gobds and tonnage duty on the ship had bee"
paid; yet Judge Pickering,.with intedlt to evade the Act of Congress, ordered th:"
ship.to be restored to the claimant without producing the certificate of paymen'
of duties and tonnage duty.
2. That at the District Court of New Hampshire in November 1802, the collete-_
having libelled said ship because of said unlawful unlading of goods and prayed
her forfeiture to the- United States, yet Judge Pickering, with intent to defeat the
just claims of the United States, refused to hear the testinony of witnesses produced to sustain the claim of the United States, and without hearing them, did
order and decree said ship to be restored to the claimant contrary to law.
3. That the Act of 24th September 1789, authorizes an appeal to the Circuit
Court in such case and the United States District Attorney did claim an appeal from
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upon each of four several articles of impeachment before the
Senate, and removed from office in March 1804.1 This case
proves that a violation of law of a particular character, and
drunkenness and profanity on the bench, are each impeachable
high crimes and misdemeanors. In this case the defence of insanity was made and supported by evidence. The case does not
show the opinion of Senators on this evidence. But if the-insanity was regarded as proved, this case shows that a criminal
intent is not necessary to constitute an impeachable high crime
and misdemeanor, but that the power of impeachment may be
interposed to protect the public against the misconduct of an
insane officer.
said decree, yet said judge, disregarding the law, intending to injure the revenues,
refused to allow an appeal.
4. That Judge Pickering being a man of loose morals and intemperate habits,
on 11th and 12th November 1802, did appear on the bench of his court for the purpose of administering justica in a state of total intoxication produced by inebriating
liquors, and did then and there frequently and in u most profane and indecent
manner invoke the name of the Supreme Being: Annals of Congress of 1803-4,
p. 319.
I This case was thus commented on during Peck's Trial:"I admit that if the charge against a judge be merely an illegal decision or a
question of property in a civil cause, his error ought to be gross and palpable indeed
to justify the inference of a criminal intention and to convict him upon an impeachment. And yet one case of this character occurred in our history. Judge Pickering was tried and condemned upon all the four articles exhibited agaihst him,
although the first three contained no other charge than that of making decisions
contrary to law in a cause involving a mere question of property; and then refusing to grant the party injured an appeal from his decision to which he was entitled:"
per Buchanan in Peck's Trial 428.
Mr. Nicholson argzrendo, 2 Chase's Trial 341, in referring to Pickering's case,says he "was impeached for drunkenness and profane swearing on the bench,
although there is no law of the United States forbidding them. Indeed I do not
know that there is any law punishing either in New Hampshire where the offence
was committed. It was said by one of the counsel that these were indictable
offences. I, however, do not-know where; certainly not in England. Drunkenness is punishable there by the ecclesiastical authority, but the temporal magistrate
never had any power over it until it was given by a statute of James I., and even
then the power was not to be exercised by the courts but only by a justice of the
peace, as is now the case in Maryland, where a small fine may be imposed."
Mr. Harper had said: "Habitual drunkenness in a judge and profane swearing
in any person are indictable offences [at common law]. And if they were not,
still they are violations of the law. I do not mean to say that there is a statute against
drunkenness and profane swearing. But they are offences against good morals,
and as such are forbidden by the common law. They are offenes in the sight ofGod and man :" 2 Chase's Trial 255, 400.

THE LAW OF IMPEACHMENT.

The next case is that of Samuel Chase,1 an associate justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States. In this case it was
;nsisted for the accused that "no judge can be impeached and
removed from office for any act or offence for which he. could not
I There were eight articles of impeachment:1. That on the trial of Fries for treason in the Circuit Court of the United States
for' Pennsylvania, in April 1800, he,
(.) Prepared and furnished counsel an opinion in writing on the questions of
law in the case, Wbford trial or argument.
"(2.) Restricted.Fri~s's counsel from recurring to certain English authorities and
statutes of the United States, illustrative of positions for defence.
(3.) Denied counsel for defence the right to argue the law of the case to the jury,
endeavoring to wrest from the jury the right to determine.questions of. law.
2. At the Circuit Court at Richmond in May 1800, Callender was arraigned for
libel on John Adamis, then Pxesident, and the judge, with intent to procure hit
conviition, overruled the objection of Iasset, one of the jury,'who wished to be,
excused because he had made up his mind, and required him to sit on the jury.
3. That with same intent thd judge refused to permit the evidence of a witness
to be given on pretence that the witness could not piove the truth of the whole of
one of the charges contained in an indictment embracing more than one fact.
4. Injustice and partiality in' said case:(I.) In compelling prisoner's counsel to reduce to writing all questions propose.
to be put to that witness.
(2.) In refusing to postpone the trial on a sufficient affidavit filed.
(3.) Rude and contemptuous expressions to counsel.
(4.) Repeated and vexatious interruptions of counsel, inducing them to abandon
their cause and client.
5. That the judge awarded a capias for the arrest of said Callender, when the
statute of Virginia in such case only authorized a summons rbqiring -the accused
to answer.
6. The judge required Callender to submit to trial during the term at which he
was indicted, in violation of the statute of Virginia, declaring that the accused
shall not answer until the next succeeding term; .the United States Judiciary Act
of 24th September 1789, recognising the state laws as rules of derision.
7. At the Circuit Court in Delaware, in'June 1800, the judge refused to discharge
the grand jury, although entreated by several of the jury to do so and after the jury
had regularly declared through their foreman. that they had 'ound nd bills of indictment nor ha& any presentment to m.lke, and 'instrubted the jury -that it was their
duty to look after a certain- seditiotts printer living in Wilmington. And the judge
enjoined on the district attorney the necessity of procuring -a,-filelof a newspaper
printed at Wilmingtonm-to -find some passage whieh-might,farnish the ground-work
of a prosecution-all with. intent toprocitre the prosecution-of said printer.
8. That the judge at' the Circuit Court at Baltimbre, in May 1803, perverted his
official right and-duty to.address the grand jury, delivering to them'an inflammatory
political harangue, with-intent to excite the people of Maryland against their state
government and against the United States.
[His address was in part against universal sufrage.]
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be indicted," either by statute or common law.' But this was
denied with convincing argument, 2 and was practically abandoned
3
by the defence.
In 1830, James H. Peck, judge of the United States District
Court for Missouri, was impeached by the House of Representatives for imprisoning and suspending from practice an attorney of
his court.4 The argument for the prosecution alluded to the propo.
sition stated in Chase's trial, "that a idge cannot be impeached
for any offence which is not indictable ;" ' but the counsel for the
accused repudiated any such doctrine as a ground of defenceY
1"2Chase's Trial 9-18, per Clark. Per Lee 107, citing 2 Bacon 97. Per Martin 137. Per Harper 254-9.
Judie Chase in his answer declared that he was only liable for a misdemeanor
"consisting in some act done or omitted in violation of law forbidding or commanding it," and that he was not impeachable "except for some offence for which
he maybe indicted:" 1 Chase's Trial 47, 48; 1 Story on Const. § 796, note,, 4
Elliott's Debates 262.
2 1 Chase's Trial 353, per Campbell. Per Rodney 378. 2 Chase's Trial 335,
339-340, per Nicholson. I Chase's Trial 335, 352; 2 Chase's 351, "It is sufficient to show that the accused has transgressed the line. of his official duty in violation of the laws of his country, and that this conduct can.6nly be accounted for on
the grouna of impure and corrupt motives :" I Chase's Trial 353, per Gampbell.
,"Violation of official duty, whether it be a proceeding against a positive law or a
proceeding unwarranted by law:" 2 Chase's Trial 340, per Nicholson.
3 2 Chase's Trial 255, per Harper.
On Peck's Trial 427, Buchanan said: "The principle fairly to be deduced from
all the arguments on the trial of Judge Chase, and from the votesof the Senate
on the article* of impeachment against him," was to hold that. a violation. of the
Constitution or law was impeachable "in opposition to the principle * * that in
order to render an offence impeachable it must be indictable."
' The charge was that as Judge of the District Court for Missouri, he on 21st
April 1826, imprisoned L. E. Lawless, an attorney, for twenty-four hours and sus'"
pended him for eighteen months from practising law, for analleged contempt of
court in publishing a newspaper article reviewing a published decision of said judge;
that said judge, unmindful of the duties of his station and that "he held the same
by the Constitution during good behavior only, with intent wrongfully and unjustly
to.oppress, imprison, and injure said Lawless, &c.' His answer conceded a liability to impeachment on facts which would not be indictable..
5 Peck's Trial 308, per Wickliffe.
6 lMr. Meredith's propositions were- (Peck's ,Trial. 327), that the court had the
power to punish contempts---that the case of Lawless was a contempt proper for its
exercise-that the punishment was proper-and lastly " that if the court had not the
power, or if having it, the ease was not a case proper for its application, still the
act did not proceed from the evil and malicious intention with which it is charged,
and which it is absolutely necessary should have accompanied it to constitute the
guilt of an impeachable offence."
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Mr. Wirt did .not hazard his reputatioi by any such claim.1
Pt... was not convicted.
The case of West W. Humphreys, judge of the United States
Ditrict Court for the District of Tennessee, proceeded on the
ground that an officer was impeachable without having committed
a statutory or common-law offence.2
In fact, the charge of adjocating secession was a crime of which
half the leading politicians of the South bad been guilty for many
years. In the seven articles of impeachment against him, two
may be said to charge treason; and it may be claimed that one
good article will sustain a conviction, by way of analogy to the
doctrine that one good count in an indictment, notwithstanding
the presence of bad ones, will sustain a sentence. But even, this
is not law in England- But there is no analogy. The Senate,
IHe

cites the opinion of Knar in a ease in 5 Johns. Rep. 291, which was a civil

action against Chancellor Lansing for punishing a contempt. KENT says: "There
must be the scienter or intentional violation of the statute, and this can never be
imputed to the judicial proceedings of a court. It would bean impeachable offence,
which can never be averred or shown but under the process of impeaciment." He
conceded that an intentionalviolation of the law was impeachable, and cited Erskine's
Speechesj vol. 1,- 374 (New York ed. 1813), to show that impeachment should be
used as -an example "to corruption and wilful abuse of authority.by extra legalpains."
And, referring to Hammond v. Howell, 1 Mod. 184, 2 Id. 218, and the remark
that complaint should be made to the king to secure the removal of a judge who had
unlawfully imprisoned a juror fdr contempt, said; that course was proper "if the
judge had acted corruptly * * that is, with a wicked intention toppress under
color of law :" Peck's Trial 493, 495.
"
2 The charges were :1. For advocating secession in a public speech at Nashville, December 29th
1860.
2. For openly supporting and advocating the Tennessee ordinance of secession.
3. For aid in organizing armed rebellion.
4. For conspiring with Jefferson Davis and others to oppose by force the authority of the government of the United States.
5. For neglecting and refusing to'lold'the District Court of the United States.
6.. For acting as a Confederate judge, and, as such, sentencing men to be banished
and imprisoned, and their property to be confiscated, for their loyalty, "and especially of property of one Andrew Johnson."
7. For the arrest.and imprisonment of "one William G. Brownlow, exercising
authority as Judge of the District Court of the Confederate States."1
He was convicted on all the articles severally by a vote on each, except that part
of art. 6, which charges him with confiscating the property of Andrew Johnson:
49 Globe, 1861-2, pl. 4, p. 2950.
. 3 Regina v. O'Connell, I1 Clark & Fin. 15 ; 9 Jurist 30 ; Wharton's Crim. Law,
§ 3047.
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by a separate vote. on each article, specifically passed on the sufficiency of each article to constitute an impeachable offence, while
a jury passes generally on all the counts of an indictment. And
it is to be observed that the report of the Judiciary Committee,
recommending impeachment, did not charge treason or other
indictable crime, nor -was there evidence of any ;1 and on the trial
of the case no doubt was expressed as to the right to convict on
each of the articles. The cases tried in the states fully sustain
the same view, both before and since the.adoption of our National
Constitution. 2
I Report No. 44, 2d Session 37th Congress, vol. 3 of House Reports.

s On the 12th July 1788, three of the judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, attached and fined Oswald £10, and imprisoned him one month, for publishing a newspaper article having a tendency to prejudice thepublic with respect
to the merits of a cause depending in court: I Dallas 319.
On 5th September 1788, Oswald memorializpd the General Assembly to determine, "whether the judges did not infringe the Constitution in direct terms in the
sentence they had pronounced; and whether, of course, they had not made themselves proper objects of impeachment."
I The House, in committee of the whole, heard the evidence. Mr. Lewis, a
member, maintained that the only grounds of impeachment were bribery, corruption, gross impartiality, or wilful" and arbitrary oppression-none of which being
proved, the memorial ought to be dismissed.
Mr. Finley, then a member, said: ,"Though he deemed it his duty to pronounce
'hat the decision of the Supreme Court was a deviation from the spirit and letter
of the frame of government, yet he did not mean to assert that any ground has
been shown for the impeachment of the judges. But on the contrary, he agreed
that bribery, corruption, or wilful and arbitrary infraction of the law, were the
only true causes for instituting a.prosecution of that nature:" see 1 Dallas 335;
Addison's Trial 129.
The House resolved by 34 to 23, that the charges of arbitrary and oppressive.
proceedings in the judges of the Supreme Court are unsupported by the testimony
introduced, and consequently that there is no just cause for impeaching the said
justices. See the report of this case in 1 Dallas, 3d ed., Phila. 1830, p. 353 [329]
On the trial of Chase, Mr. Rodney, referring to this case, said: " Three of the
judges of their Supreme Court were accused of fining and imprisoning, without
the intervention of a jury, a fellow-citizen, for publishing- a paper which, they
considered as a contempt of court. The judges were defended by two most able
and eloquent counsel, who contenddd that the constitution, the laws and the practice of Pennsylvania, by adopting the common-law doctrines on the subject, justified
the proceeding, and that if there was no law to justify it, their conduct flowed.
from an honest error in judgment. But, sir, they did not attempt to maintain the
position contended for on this occasion, that to support an impeachment the conduct of a judge must be such as to subject him to an indictment:" see 2 Chase'sTrial 399.
VOL. XV.-43
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Judge Addison' was impeached in Pennsylvania in 1802, and
his defence was that he had committed no act indictable at common law ; but the Senate almost unanimously convicted him,
utterly repudiating that as a defence.
In Massachusetts,2 the rule is well settled in conformity with
I Impeachment of Alexander Addison, President Judge of the Courts of Common Pleas of Westmoreland and other counties, 1802-3, convicted of-1. Directing a jury that the address of an associate judge to them "had nothing to do with
the question before them ;" and- 2. Preventing an associate judge from addressing
the grand jury concerning their duties, by denying the right, and by leaving the
bench and thus irregularly adjourning the court:" Addison's Trial, by Thomas
Lloyd, 2d ed., Lancaster, 1803.
Mr. McKean, one of the managers, in opening the trial, said: " Offences under
color of office * * have always been considered as the most proper, and of course
the usual, ground of impeachment. They are such as the ordinary magistrates cannot
or daie not punish. * * Itoften happens that officers may and do abuse their power,
to the injury of the commonwealth, and at the same time in such a manner as not
to render their conduct cognisable before the ordinary tribunals of justice, so as to
proceed by indictment or information:" see Addison's Trial 31.
In'Pennsylvania the courts entertain jurisdiction of common-law crimes. The
attorney-general filed a motion for a rule against Addison, to show cause in the
Supreme Cotirt why an information should not be filed against him. The couit
held that it was the right of the associate judge to address the grand jury: but the
court, per Chief Justice SnirrEm, said;
The affidavit does not state malice. It
would seem to be a mistake of right. Unless a crime is stated, the court cannot
take cognisance. There may be another remedy [by impeachment]. It does not
lie with us to say what that is. The proceeding was arbitrary, unbecoming,
unhandsome, ungentlemanly, unmannerly, and improper; but 'there not being at
imputation of wilful misbehavior and malice, it is not indictable or the subject of
an information :" Trial 70.
Judge Addison in his defence said: "No impeachment will lie but for a misdemeanor in office, and every misdemeanor in office is indietabie; the officer
impeached still remains liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment
according to law. An impeachment lies only where an indictment lies; no officer
can be convicted on an impeachment who ought not to be convicted on an indictment; and the punishment on impeachment is cumulative-not exclusive
Tho
acts for which an officer may be impeached are precisely those for which he may
be indicted as an officer: misdemeanprs in office, offences or unlawful acts done
with an evil intention in his official capacity:" Trial 104.
"'Amere unlawful act from a mistake or error in judgment cannot be alleged
as a [impeachable] crime. Not only wrong, but wilful wrong must be made out,
or the offence is not complete:" p. 118.
"Though a judge acts unlawfully and unconstitutionally, he cannot be convicted
on an impeachment, unless he has acted wilfully so:" p. 129; see I Dallas 335.
But this position was denied, and Addison was found guilty by a vote of 20 to 4.
See this case referred to, 2 Chase's Trial 396.
2The Massachusetts cases are :I. Impeachment of William Greenleaf, sheriff of Worcester county, 1788.
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what seems to be the recognised doctrine in the Senate of the
United States.
Among the cases tried with great learning and ability there, is
that of James Prescott, ' who was convicted before the Senate.
Convicted-(l). Of detaining for his private use public moneys, when the commonwealth has a right thereto; (2). Of exhibiting dishonest accounts of tax-S
collected; (3). Of detaining for two years public moneys from town of Petersham:
(4). Of procuring from the treasurer of commonwealth an execution for money
previously collected by him; (5). Of false returns on executions ; (6). Of procuring a warrant of distress for money previously paid him.
2. Impeachment of William Hunt, a justice of the peace of Watertown, 1794.
Convicted of entering on his docket, on the trial day of causes, the personal
appearance of plaintiffs, who were absent, though defendants demanded their
appearance. The Senate found Hunt guilty, but suspended judgment for a year.,
3. Impeachment of John, Vinal, a justice of the peace of Suffolk county, 1800.
Convicted of extortion and bribery.
4. Impeachment of Moses'Copeland, a justice of the peace for Lincoln county,
1607-8. Acquitted on charges--st. That he bought a note indorsed in blank,
and entertained suit in name of Samuel Kingsbury, and rendered judgment, though
in fact the note was Copeland's; 2d. For defaulting a defendant, and entering
judgment before the hour set for trial
; 3d. Bribery.
5. Impeachment of James Prescott, Judge of Probate for Middlesex, 1821.
Convicted of exacting illegal fees, and of inserting by interlineation in a guardian's account, previously sworn to, an item due to and paid to himself, and then
of settling the account as judge.
See "Pescotts Trial, by Pickering and Gardiner, Boston, 1821.1" In 'the
appendix is an abstract of the preceding impeachments. On the trial of Prescott,
it was said by Mr.'Blake, arguendo, that "within the compass offorty long yeas,
three or four solitary instances of trial by impeachment have occurred in this commonwealth. Of these, two I believe [three] resulted in a conviction; and I feel
myself justified in stating, that in*neither of the instances alluded to was there any
point of constitutional law involved in the inquiry."
This case was conducted with great ability.
I In 1821 Prescott, a judge of probate, was impeached before the Senate of Massachusetts. The 12th article charged that Ware was guardian of Birch, a Ron
conpos mentis; that Grout, one of the overseers of the poor, had some controversy
with the guardian as to some property of the ward, not involved in the account;
that the judge, as attorney, advised the parties, and charged, and was paid $5 by
the guardian therefor; that the judge interlined this item in the account which had
been previously sworn to, and settled the account allowing this item: Prescotts
Trial 189. The law did not prohibit judges from acting as attorneys in matters
not coming before their court.
It was objected by the defence that this 'was not an offence indictable, and so
not impeachable; that especially was this so in Massachusetts, since the constitution authorized a removal upon the address of both Houses of the Legislature for
any cause, and left impeachment against 'officers for misconduct or maladministration in their offices."
But one of the managers said in substance: C We stand here on no statute, on
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-Mr. Blake i 'for the defence, insisted that impeachment is ",
process which can only, be resorted to for the punishment of some
-great offence against a known, settled law of the land." The
prosecution maintained "'that any wilful violation of law, or any
wilful and corrupt act of omission or commission in execution or
under color of office * * it such an act of misconduct and maladministration in office as %
will render him liable to punishment by
impeachment."
Chief Justice CHASE evidently holds that a failure to perform
official duty is inipeachable, without reference to its indictable
character or the motives therefor. And further that the Senate
is so entirely the exclusive judge of what is official delinquency,
that the President cannot protect himself against impeachment for
a failure to execute a law by the decree of a court enjoining him
therefrom.
On the 15th April 1867, in refusing the application of the socalled state of Mississippi for leave to file a bill to enjoin the
execution of the "1Reconstrution Acts". of Congress, he-said:'Suppose.the bill filed and the injunction prayed for be allowed.
If the' President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that
the court is-without power to enforce its process. If, on the other
hand, the President complies with the order of the court, and
refuses to execute the Act of Congress, is it not clear thAt a collision may occur between the executive and legislatfe departments
of the government ? May not the House of Representatives imno particular law of the commonwealth; there is none for such a case. We stand
here upon the broad principles of the common law-of common justice * * Such
conduct is disgraceful and contrary io the usages of all civilized nations. * *
We have shown the conduct of the respondent * * to have been grossly improper
and mischievous in its tendency; this is quite enough ; he has rendered himself
unworthy of offce, and therefore ought.to be impeached and removed :" Prescott's
Trial 149. See Dutton's remarks 19 -4.
And so the Senate decided by a vote of 19 to 6, and convicted Judge Prescott.
IPrescott's Trial 114. He quoted 4 Blackstone 259, that impeachment C1is a
prosecution of the already known and established law ;" and 2-Wooddeson 611;
and part I of Dolby's Report of the Trial of the Queen, p. 84i, on a bill of pains
and penalties for adultery, where it was said by the Earl of Liverpool, "1he knew
not how they could make that a subject of impeachment, which by the law of England was not a crime."
Mr. Webster for the defence said: C An impeachment is a prosecution for the
violation of existing laws :" Prescott's Trial 164.
2 Prescott's Trial 182, per Shaw. See Dutton's speech 194.
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peach the President for such refusal? And in that case could
this court interpose in behalf of the President, thus endangered
by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the
Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public
wonder of an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in that
court ?
" These questions answer themselves."
The question whether an act is impeachable whicl is not indictable at common law when committed by officers who are answerable by indictment, is only important to determine how far the
remedy by impeachment extends. But almost every conceivable
act of official misdemeanor is at common law indictable, though,
on grounds of public policy, the higher officers are not liable to
prosecution in the ordinary courts for official misdemeanors.
But the question, as already shown, is put at rest by the practice in England, by the language of the Constitution, by the
opinions of its framers, by contemporaneous exposition, by the
uniform usage under it, and by the uniform opinion of all the
elementary writers. The value of these it is unnecessary to dis-,
cuss, as they are understood by all lawyers.'
It has already been shown that the violation of a public statute,
though the statute in terms provides no punishment, is at common
law indictabler
But it may be urged that if an officer charged by the Constitution and his oath with the duty of executing the laws, knowingly
and intentionally suspends the operation of a particular statute,
refuses to execute another, and violates a third, but does so with.
a view to promote the public interest, his motives are good, 'nd
he is not impeachable.
This view, so plausible and insidious, is nevertheless so dangerous that its very monstrous character will show that it cannot be
maintained. An example will illustrate'it. Let it be supposed
that with the initiatory steps of the rebellion the President had
declared that the national government had no constitutional power
to suppress a rebellion by force of arms.2
IThey are discussed in Sedgwick on Statutory and. Constitutional Construction.
In the message of December 4th 1860, the President said: "1The power to
make war against a state is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the
Constitution. * * Our Union rests upon public opinion. If it cannot live in
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Now, whether such an utterance-was extorted by fear or might
have been an honest but perverted political theory, or the result
of a treasonable purpose to aid traitors, would have been in its
consequences to the nation all-the same if it could have controlled
the counsels of the nation. This sentiment, believed and acted
on, would have witnessed- the destruction of the government.
And must the nation perish because a President honestly believes
in the fatal heresy that the Constitution and Congress are powerless for self-preservation ? If so, the nation must die out of tender regard to the political idiosyncrasy of the President! Thd
game fatal error of opinion and conduct will be impeachable ii
one President who knows the Tight and yet the wrong pursues,
while another who believes in a fallacy because he loves it will
escape unpunished, though the inherent wrong in principle and in
effect is the same in both cases.
If the President would undertake to expel Congress as an illegal body, he could scarcely escape impeachment upon a plea of
good motives. No tyrant ever yet reigned who did not plead
good motives for his usurpations. But even these, if they could
-be so in fact, can never sanctify criminal acts. As well might
larceny be justified by a purpose to promote charitable objects,
as violations of the Constitution by professions of securing the
public interest. In both cases the motive i8illegal, and no circumstances can justify a criminal act purposely committed.
Congress may withhold punishment or pass acts of ihdemnity,
just as the President may pardon crime; but criminal purposes,
studiously persisted in, present no case for clemency.
This subject, so far as it relates to ordinary courts, is well
understood. Sedgwick, under the caption "Good faith no excuse
for violation of statutes," says: "We have already had occasion
to notice the rule that ignorance of the law cannot be set up in
defence. All are bound to. know the la~i; and this holds good
as well in regard to common as to statute law, as well in regard
to criminal as to civil cases. In regard even to .penal laws, it is
strictly true that ignorance is no excuse for the violation of a
statute.' So in regard to frequent attempts which have been
the affections of the people, it must one day perish. Congress possesses many
means of preserving it by conciliation; but the sword was not placed in their
hands to preserve it by force."
I Smith v. Brown,, I Wend. 231 ; Caswell v. Allen, 7 Johns. 63.
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made to exonerate individuals charged with disobedience to penal
laws on the ground of good faith or error qf judgment, it hai
been held that no excuse of this kind will avail against the peremptory words of a statute imposing a penalty. If the prohibited
act has been done, the penalty must be paid."'
And this but reiterates the law of impeachment, as recognised
in England and the United States.
Judges have been impeached in Eng.land "for misinterpreting
the laws," and the Earl of Bristol for advising "against a war
I Scdgwick on Stat. & Const. Law 100; Calcroft r. Gibbs, 5 Term R. 19;
M"orris v. People, 3 Denio 381-402 ; People v. Brooks, I Id. 457. On the trial
of Warren Dlastings, it was argued that he had exerted his "powers for the publie
good." But the Lord Chancellor said 11however pure his intentions might have been,
if he violated every principle of morality and justice, he should not'think that anl
public agency ought to be pleaded as a justificatioa."
March 2. Lord TIuRLOw said: "The number of articles preferred were
twenty, each containing a great number of allegations ; of this number the Coutmnos had given no evidence upon fourteen, and upon very inconsiderable parts of
three more."
"The impeachment, however, might now be said to rest upon four points-breach of faith, oppression, and injustice, as in the two articles of Cheyt Sing and
the Begum ; corruption, as in the article of the presents, and a wanton waste of
the public money for private purposes, as in the contracts. In considering the first
two points, he conceived it would' become their Lordships to reflect on the situation
in which Mr. Hastings was placed. Possessed of absolute power, the question
would be, had he exerted that power for the public good, or had he on any occasion been actuated by base or malicious motives? If in the case of Cheyt Sing
and the Begums, their Lordships should be of opinion that he was neither malicious
nor corrupt, the charges naturally fell to the ground."
"The Lord Chancellor coneurred generally in what had fallen from the noble
and learned lord, butcould not go quite so far as to say that Mr. Hastings would
be justified in any gross abuse of the arbitrary power which he possessed, even
though it should be made clear that he was actuated neither by &orrupt nor by
malicious motives. Mfr. Hastings had great powerlodged in his hands undoubtedly. HIe was responsible to his country for a proper use of that power ; and
however pure his intentions might have been, if he violated every principle of
morality and justice, he should not think that any public exigency ought to be
pleaded as a justification."
March 5. The Lord Chancellor said "The conduct of the governor-general
in relation to the transactions with Cheyt Sing in the year 1780, appeared to him
to stand in a diffierent point of view and to call for other considerations. To say
'the least of that conduct on the part of Mr. 'Hastings, it merited a certain degree
of blame; but how far it might rise up to a high crime and misdemeanor would
depend on other and future proceedings of the governor-general, that yet remained
to be discussed."

